Examining the Institutional Factors Affecting Cost Growth in Defense Acquisition: May Yield More Effective Policy Interventions by Candreva, Philip
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Reports and Technical Reports All Technical Reports Collection
2009-07-30
Examining the Institutional Factors
Affecting Cost Growth in Defense









Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited. 
 








Examining the Institutional Factors  
Affecting Cost Growth in Defense Acquisition  
May Yield More Effective Policy Interventions 
30 July 2009 
by 
Philip J. Candreva, Senior Lecturer 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy 
















The research presented in this report was supported by the Acquisition Chair of the 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
 
 
To request Defense Acquisition Research or to become a research sponsor, 
please contact: 
 
NPS Acquisition Research Program 
Attn: James B. Greene, RADM, USN, (Ret)  
Acquisition Chair 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
555 Dyer Road, Room 332 
Monterey, CA 93943-5103 
Tel: (831) 656-2092 
Fax: (831) 656-2253 
e-mail: jbgreene@nps.edu   
 







do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - i - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Abstract 
Existing studies of cost growth in defense acquisition have been 
predominantly descriptive rather than explanatory. While observers of defense 
acquisition acknowledge the role of cultural and institutional factors on program 
performance, few studies are focused there. However, recent studies have 
highlighted the importance of decision-making by government officials as a factor 
affecting cost growth. Informed by the literatures on cost growth, behavioral finance, 
group decision-making, and organizational failure, this report proposes a research 
stream to consider factors affecting cost growth beyond those traditionally studied. 
The study suggests that Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development framework 
can be the foundation of a research stream that includes both field studies and 
laboratory/computational experiments that can provide fresh insights into the cost 
growth phenomenon and—more importantly—aid in the design of more effective 
policy interventions to address the problem.  
Keywords: cost growth, defense acquisition, program performance, 
behavioral finance, group decision-making, organizational failure, Ostrom’s 
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Introduction 
The US defense department suffers from persistent, but not certain, cost 
growth within major acquisition programs. Over the past few decades, scores of 
empirical studies have examined the causes and consequences of cost growth and 
have shed light on characteristics of programs that fail to meet cost performance 
goals. They have looked at factors such as the size of the program, its phase in the 
development cycle, the type of weapon being purchased and organizational 
structure. Other studies have taken a more qualitative view—considering the 
interplay of actions within a program office and between a program office and its 
environment. Both types of studies have provided countless recommendations to fix 
defense acquisition. Yet, problems persist. Twenty-first century shipbuilding, for 
example, suffers some of the same challenges described in Ian Toll’s account of 
building the 18th century navy in his book, Six Frigates: rising material costs, labor 
shortages, inaccurate estimates, unproven technologies, requirements creep, 
decisions based on politics instead of economics or national security, reduced 
procurement quantities, sliding schedules, and occasional mismanagement. Those 
factors often result in cost growth. Given the materiality of the problem (i.e., 
hundreds of billions of dollars), the number of times it has been studied, the attention 
of the highest levels of government, and the myriad rules that have resulted in 
attempts to reform acquisition, two questions motivate the present study: Why does 
the problem persist? What have the studies and policy prescriptions missed? 
In search of an answer, this study proposes a fresh line of research that 
combines field work with laboratory and computation experimentation employing a 
framework that considers variables beyond those traditionally used. Through a 
mutually supportive set of studies that combine the realism of field studies with the 
ability to rigorously test hypotheses through models in computational and laboratory 
experiments, considering new factors, policy makers may gain fresh insights on the 
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Before describing that line of research, it is first necessary to examine its 
theoretical foundations. First, the cost growth literature is summarized. Two recent 
and important deviations from the norm of those studies will be examined in more 
detail as they focus less on the acquisition program and more on the decisions made 
by officials about the program. These deviations led to a review of the literature 
regarding individual and group decision-making, specifically as related to public 
budgeting and financial decision-making. Budgeting is central because cost growth 
is manifest by the allocation of financial resources to a program over time. This study 
was also informed by the literature on the dynamics of failure in large organizations. 
In sum, this is not simply a look at decision-making; it is a look at decision making 
about financial resources that persistently leads to undesirable outcomes. 
After reviewing the literature, a framework for analysis is presented that will 
guide future research toward potentially explanatory factors that have not been 
explicitly considered in prior studies. Specifically, those factors relate to institutional 
and cultural forces that affect decision-making. The framework is then applied very 
broadly to the dynamics of defense acquisition in order to illustrate the framework 
and highlight additional factors. The paper concludes with a recommendation for a 
set of studies that would apply the framework at more appropriate levels to generate 
and test hypotheses that will lead to greater understanding of the dynamics within 
specific programs or decision contexts.  It is through an increased understanding of 
the dynamics of this complex adaptive system that policy interventions can be 
conceived, designed, tested and refined before they are enacted. Better designed 
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Toward a New Way to Study Defense Acquisition  
Before the McCain-Levin “Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009” 
(S.454) was introduced in February of 2009, the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) assessed the likely efficacy of the proposed reforms and concluded, “Our 
discussions with acquisition experts indicate that these changes may not achieve the 
desired improvement in acquisition outcomes unless they are accompanied by 
changes in the overall acquisition environment, its culture, and the incentives 
provided for success” (2009, p. 2). Two things are important to note: first, the 
environment, culture and incentives are salient moderating factors; second, 
acquisition experts already know about such factors. Interestingly, those factors 
have not been adequately addressed in cost growth studies. 
Cost Growth 
Scores of studies over the past two to three decades have sought to 
understand the causes and consequences of cost growth in defense acquisition 
programs. As a result, a great deal is known about aspects of the problem. Studies 
have examined whether the size of a program is germane (Coleman, Summerville, 
DuBois, & Myers, 2000; Dameron, Pullen, Summerville, Coleman, & Snead, 2001; 
Arena, Leonard, Murray, & Younossi, 2006). They have studied growth within 
Selected Acquisition Report categories and other taxonomies, such as estimating 
errors, inflation, and engineering changes (Eskew, 2000). Studies have looked at 
differences in cost growth across types of weapons systems, for example aircraft 
and missiles (Dameron et al, 2001) (Younossi, Arena, Leonard, Roll, Jain, & 
Sollinger, 2007). Other studies have looked at the point in the development cycle 
when cost growth tends to occur—whether it is more an R&D issue or a production 
issue (Coleman et al., 2000) (Tyson, Harmon, & Utech, 1994) (Younossi et al., 
2007). Organizational structural issues such as reporting relationships (Kadish et al., 
2006), centralization of authority (Dillard, 2004), and knowledge flows (GAO, 2008) 
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Extant cost studies have been overwhelmingly descriptive rather than 
explanatory. Knowing that more growth occurs during R&D than production is helpful 
but does not explain why. Knowing that aircraft programs suffer more growth than 
missile programs may suggest more management attention be placed there, yet that 
knowledge has not improved outcomes. With few exceptions, studies of cost growth 
in defense acquisition have adopted the foundational assumptions of economics or 
systems engineering. When the analyst approaches the political, institutional, social, 
or psychological dimensions of the problem, those issues are assumed away and 
left for further research or defined as outside the bounds of the study. When the 
social issues have a salient effect on the conclusions, they are addressed but not 
sufficiently analyzed. A notable example is the 2006 Defense Acquisition 
Performance Assessment (DAPA) Report, which asserts a “conspiracy of hope” 
among the actors in acquisition (Kadish et al., 2006). This “conspiracy” was a major 
influence on the present study: what is it, how does it work, why does it exist?  
Two recent studies, however, have taken a slightly different approach to the 
cost growth phenomenon and offer new insights. RAND looked beyond the 
traditional cost categorization studies in an attempt to understand underlying causes 
(Bolten, Leonard, Arena, Younossi, & Sollinger, 2008). Using Selected Acquisition 
Reports (SAR) from 35 major weapons programs, the authors abandoned the SAR 
taxonomy and analyzed the supporting documentation to determine underlying 
causes of the cost growth. They found that two-thirds of cost growth could be 
attributed to decisions made by government officials. Those decisions concerned 
questions of affordability, and changes to resources, quantities, requirements, and 
schedules. Their report provides an important insight, but while the study identified 
the content of decisions, its design cannot answer the more important question, why 
were those decisions made? And, from that, under what conditions could better 
decisions be made?  
The second study considered projects outside the defense establishment. 
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identified psychological and institutional biases in the estimates and decisions to 
fund the projects (Flyvbjerg, Holm, & Buhl, 2002; Flyvbjerg, Holm, & Buhl, 2004). 
They noted two forms of bias: psychological biases of the type explained in the work 
of Kahneman and Tversky (to be considered below), and political biases. Flyvbjerg 
charged that officials misrepresented project costs in an effort to seek approval of 
the projects. That is, they deliberately presented underestimates of the cost of the 
project. Flyvbjerg uses the term “strategic misrepresentation,” a term previously 
used in studies of public budgeting (Jones & Euske, 1991).  Jones and Euske note 
that strategic misrepresentation “is a contingent strategy responsive to a system of 
rewards in a highly competitive game where resource constraints are present” 
(1991, p. 437). The word “strategic” is important to consider here. These officials are 
making a deliberate decision to lie because they believe it is an appropriate strategy 
given their context and perceived payoff. What is it about the context, the payoff, and 
the norms of the institutions these decision-makers find themselves in that result in 
such behavior?  
Decision-making Behavior    
There are two literatures regarding decision-making that pertain to the issue 
at hand. The first concerns the non-rational behavior commonly and consistently 
found when people make financial decisions. The works of Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) and Thaler (1999) are germane. The second literature concerns group 
decision-making processes, and the works of Simon (1960), March (1994) and 
Jones (2001) are germane. 
Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory (1979) provides a descriptive view 
of human decision-making that consistently and predictably deviates from the 
rational utility-maximizing assumptions of many economic models. In summary, 
people are more attentive to changes in wealth than its absolute value; they are 
more likely to accept risk in a potential financial gain than they are in potential 
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natural biases affect the manner in which problems are framed, which in turn affects 
decisions. 
Thaler’s mental accounting research (1999) demonstrates that people 
categorize and evaluate financial events in a manner that defies the assumption of 
fungibility of money. Financial events are believed to have both acquisition value 
(the value of the money involved) and transaction value (the emotional value of the 
event—the “good deal”). It is such mental accounting that results in non-rational 
behavior such as spending “found money” (i.e., the unexpected $10 bill in a jacket 
pocket) more frivolously than $10 deliberately withdrawn from a savings account. 
From Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Thaler (1999), we know that actual 
financial decision-making often defies the tidy logic of conventional economic 
studies. Since human nature is predictably non-rational, policy interventions can be 
designed to exploit those tendencies. Such is the point of Thaler and Sunstein’s 
recent bestseller, Nudge (2008). There is no reason to believe decision-making 
related to defense acquisition is immune from such tendencies. 
Not only are individuals prone to non-rational decisions regarding financial 
matters, they are also boundedly rational. That is, the assumption of perfect 
information common in economic models—all relevant information is available, there 
is infinite information processing capability, and decision-maker preferences are self-
interested, known, and stable—are relaxed based on the knowledge that such 
assumptions simply are not true. Decision-makers do not have all available 
information: they have limited attention spans and processing capabilities, their 
desires are not necessarily stable, and they often act in the interest of others, even 
altruistically.  Beach and Connolly (2005) demonstrate the effects of heuristics, 
framing, biases and emotions on decision-making. They find that within groups, 
individual limitations are not necessarily overcome and members of the group 
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In his work on organizational decision-making, March (1994) advances the 
idea that in certain contexts a good decision is measured not by the outcome but by 
the appropriateness of the decision.  Decisions are made not through a logic of 
rational choice or a logic of consequences but through rule-following and the pairing 
of an understanding of appropriateness to the specifics of the situation. Often in 
public administration, appropriateness is paramount. Means become ends in 
themselves. What others think about one’s actions cannot be so easily dismissed, as 
evidenced by ethics rules concerning the “mere perception of impropriety.” 
Appropriateness adds a moral dimension to decision-making that utility maximization 
does not thereby affecting the criteria by which decisions are made, the perceived 
payoffs of alternative decisions, and the information gathered and considered. In 
group decision-making situations, especially when members of the group represent 
different sets of values, there are inconsistencies in decision criteria, power 
struggles, coalitions, and compromises (March, 1994). 
Bryan Jones (2001) applies these concepts of decision-making (along with 
evolutionary biology) to public policy. Humans, and the organizations in which they 
play a role, process information from their environments and take action. In order to 
act, they must attend to the information, interpret it, and devise a strategy on which 
to act on it. Attention is dichotomous—one either pays attention or does not—so the 
amount of information is limited and some form of selection or filtering must occur. 
Only the most salient information should be attended to. What is salient depends on 
the decision-makers, their experience, heuristics, and the role they play. The quality 
of the interpretation of the information is a function of the knowledge of people, their 
cognitive abilities, and the biases already noted. The strategy is affected cognitively 
by expected outcomes, but it is also shaped emotionally by institutional norms, rules, 
and customs. Strategies may include strategic misrepresentation, as noted earlier. 
Thus, any two individuals confronted with the same information, in the same context, 
will not necessary arrive at the same decision. The differences are likely to be more 
pronounced when the volume of information increases, the complexity or uncertainty 
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ambiguous or contradictory, and if there are repeated decisions in a recurring 
process (Jones, 2001).   
Where behavior tends to be more idiosyncratic, organizational rules, 
procedures and routines provide some consistency. Too much consistency can be 
problematic in a changing environment, so the paradox of organizations is that they 
must be routine based and flexible at the same time. A major source of flexibility is 
the adaptability and heterogeneity of its members.  
At this point it is vital to ask whether defense acquisition is afflicted by 
boundedly rational, heterogeneous programs and could those contribute to cost 
growth? Apparently so. A recent GAO report concluded, “The uniqueness of each 
program, the lack of sufficient knowledge about system requirements, technology 
and design maturity, and the limited analytical tools available are often cited as 
factors that contribute to optimistic forecasts of development costs” (2009, p. 13). 
Persistent Failure in Organizations    
In addition to the limitations of past cost growth studies and the nature of 
group decision-making, a third major influence on this study is the literature 
regarding persistently failing organizations.  By one definition, such organizations 
are those in which the official goals of sponsors or owners are not accomplished 
(Meyer & Zucker, 1989). Cost growth in defense acquisition meets that definition. 
Meyer and Zucker wondered how it could be that an organization survives for many 
years despite failing to meet those goals. Using a broad approach employing social 
movement theory, strategic management, agency theory, and transaction costs, they 
conclude that an organization’s performance need not determine its survival, 
provided there are sufficiently powerful actors whose interests are served more by 
the presence of the organization than its performance. It is reasonable to expect a 
similar dynamic affects some acquisition programs and the pattern of behaviors 
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Bissell’s (2008) study of public bureaucracy failure—not unlike past studies of 
defense acquisition—notes a tendency to overlook the socio-cultural elements of 
government work. His study cites a tendency to adopt technocratic and rationalist 
perspectives when debating policy, while “failing to consider the conflicts, 
contradictions, and counter-intuitive outcomes that are inherent in planning in 
complex situations” (2008).  
Gailey and Lee (2007) studied the assignment of blame for deviance in 
organizations through a sociological perspective. They suggest that studying 
deviance (cost growth is a form of deviance) includes both an examination of the 
intent of actions and the selection of an appropriate level of analysis. Vaughn (2007) 
and Yeager (2007) note that culture is the mediating mechanism between macro 
levels (i.e., societal, constitutional), meso levels (i.e., organizational, policy) and 
micro levels (i.e., individual, operational) of analysis. That is, human behavior is 
situated among these forces and intent, or sense-making, is affected by 
considerations at all levels.1 Cultural norms and beliefs determine appropriateness 
(using March’s (1994) word) and may normalize deviant actions: “culture redefines 
deviance so that it appears to be conformity” (Gailey & Lee, 2007, p. 541). For 
example, examinations of the Challenger space shuttle disaster and the Tuskegee 
syphilis studies reveal cultural orientations of technical rationality and routinization of 
operations lead to a moral blindness in business decisions. In such situations, 
achieving a technical solution can become paramount, and the associated social 
costs are undervalued. Resolving deviance in an organizational context requires 
remedies that affect the culture and not solely the behavior (Gailey & Lee, 2007). 
In an attempt to understand the multi-layered cultural influences on 
organizational failure, Collier (2002) drew on the Institutional Analysis and 
Development framework of Ostrom and her colleagues in a study of corruption. Like 
                                            
1 The techniques in the stream of research proposed in this paper are particularly well suited to 
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cost growth in acquisition, corruption is a form of organizational failure that diverts 
resources from more beneficial uses, distracts attention, and ultimately affects the 
security of the state. Like defense acquisition, corruption had been studied at length, 
without considering the interplay of economic, cultural and political forces. The IAD 
framework enabled Collier “to combine several seemingly unrelated theories of 
political, economic, and cultural behaviors into one interdisciplinary social theory” 
(2002, p. 25). He was able to offer a mid-level theoretical explanation of corruption 
and to identify several social phenomena that warrant further study on an individual 
and interactive basis. He also identified reasons why it is so difficult to uproot 
corruption. Inspired by Collier’s work, this paper suggests a similar path to 
understanding cost growth in defense acquisition. 
Integrating these literatures, it is apparent that perfectly rational decision-
makers who always seek to obtain the optimal outcome as decided by competent 
authority are lacking; rather, boundedly rational people making decisions that are 
sometimes goal-seeking and sometimes appropriate are prevalent. Decisions about 
financial matters are prone to known biases that very well may affect the quality of 
decisions about defense budget allocations. The decisions reflect strategies affected 
by explicitly understood organizational rules and implicitly understood institutional 
norms and customs. In certain contexts, those rules, norms and customs are well 
aligned and the organization (acquisition program) achieves a successful outcome. 
In other contexts, the rules, norms and customs may have created an environment 
in which cost growth becomes acceptable or inevitable. A conscious (or 
unconscious) “conspiracy of hope” ensues and the program fails to achieve a major 
goal. The remedy for such a problem cannot be found solely in rational, technical 
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A Promising Framework   
How does one, then, seek to understand this relationship between the 
decision makers, the organization, its context, and institutional cultural concerns?  
As Frederickson and Smith (2003) stated, “in simplified form, institutionalism sees 
organizations as bounded social constructs of rules, roles, norms, and the 
expectations that constrain individual and group choice and behavior” (p. 71). After 
considering several views of institutionalism, the neoinstitutional work of Elinor 
Ostrom, fits best. Her Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework (used 
by Collier (2002) in his study of corruption) is described in more detail later in the 
paper, but, in short, it considers “action arenas” composed of both an action situation 
and actors. The action situation involves “participants in positions who must decide 
among diverse actions in light of the information they possess about how actions are 
linked to potential outcomes and the costs and benefits assigned to actions and 
outcomes” (Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 1994, p. 29). While the model allows the 
actors to meet the criteria of self-interested agents who have stable and certain 
preferences and optimizes their utility using perfect information, the actors can also 
be acknowledged to have varying preferences, bounded information processing 
capabilities, and not entirely self-interested decision criteria that may even be 
altruistic—in addition to bringing unique resources to bear on the problem. These 
action arenas are not situated in a sterile context, but are affected by the attributes 
of the environment, attributes of the communities within which the actors identify, 
and institutional norms. Within the action area, patterns of interaction result in 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 12 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 
It is immediately apparent that the IAD framework considers factors that have 
not been a formal part of prior defense acquisition cost growth studies. But is the 
framework appropriate for defense? In the literature review of organizational failure, 
it has been successfully applied to one type of government failure. More commonly, 
the IAD framework has been used to explain the management of common pool 
resources. Appendix 1 makes the argument that the defense budget is a common 
pool resource. Since cost growth is fundamentally about comparing the amount of 
funding provided to an acquisition program at a minimum of two points in time, the 
allocation of funds from the pool of available dollars is the central concern. 
Conclusion     
In this paper, I argue that the application of Ostrom’s IAD framework to the 
phenomenon of cost growth in the Department of Defense has the potential to yield 
recommendations for policy interventions that will improve acquisition outcomes. 
This is a conceptual paper, not an empirical one, and so I recommend the concepts 
be tested empirically. I recommend a campaign of empirical research and base that 
recommendation on an illustrative analysis of recent studies of defense acquisition 
employing the IAD framework.   
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The Institutional Analysis and Development 
Framework 
Why a Framework?    
There is no theory that explains cost growth in defense acquisition. A theory 
asserts an underlying reality concerning an observed class of phenomena.  
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory is an example, as is March’s 
(1994) organizational decision-making. Theories help explain phenomena by telling 
why a condition came to be or what factors moderate that condition. To understand 
the causes or conditions that create cost growth in defense acquisition, a new theory 
may be created or the boundaries of existing theory may be addressed.  To do so, 
the phenomenon must be approached in a structured manner that allows the 
researcher to isolate and observe the variables believed to be relevant. Here is 
where a framework is helpful.  Frameworks are like maps in that they abstract reality 
with the purpose aiding navigation by means of a directive function (Shields & Tajalli, 
2006). In the present case, a researcher will use a framework to ensure the 
necessary and sufficient elements of an institutional analysis are considered. The 
framework provides a list of variables (including interactions between variables) and 
can generate the required questions when an analysis is conducted.  It allows the 
research to be categorized into individual, manageable sections.   
Once the framework is populated with specific data, a model may be 
constructed. To illustrate, a framework of aircraft flight includes concepts like lift and 
gravity, drag and thrust, and the operation of elements such as wings and tails. The 
framework is based on theories of physics and fluid dynamics such as Bernoulli’s 
principle. A model is a representation of a particular aircraft; the wings may be fixed 
or rotating depending on the particular arrangement of the variables.  The values 
assigned to variables in the framework may be adjusted, guided by theories, on a 
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aided design of mechanical systems. It is also possible to do with organizational 
design and social systems.  
The last section of this paper describes how some organizational behavior 
and decision-making theories that were covered in the literature review could be 
tested for their ability to explain behaviors that affect cost growth in defense 
acquisition. Before getting there, this section will present the framework for analysis.  
Institutional Analysis and Development Framework    
The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework assumes that all 
social interactions can be viewed as composed of the same set of elements, 
whether they are economic markets, political organs, community or fraternal groups, 
hierarchical organizations, or sporting events. The IAD framework neatly mirrors the 
variables commonly used in game theory and organizational simulations (Ostrom et 
al., 1994), thereby allowing a researcher to perform structured exploratory and 
grounded research in the field and then to bring those findings into a laboratory or 
computational setting for hypothesis testing. Figure 2 (p.16) and Figure 1 (p. 12) 
summarize the elements of the framework. 
The focal point of the framework is the action arena, which consists of actors 
who interact in an action situation, affected by exogenous factors. The action 
situation consists of seven elements: actors, roles, actions, outcomes, a production 
function that links actions to outcomes, information, and payoffs. Individual actors 
serve in roles. It should be noted that in a complex action situation, an actor may 
serve in more than one role, and actors normally serve in several roles across 
different action arenas. Within those roles, actors act and rules define the possible 
and appropriate actions. Depending on the level of analysis, the actors can be an 
individual, a group of individuals, or a social construct such as an organization or 
social system. There is a body of information available to all actors in the action 
arena, should they choose to access it. Actors are characterized, in part, by their 
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actors results in some outcome that has an associated payoff for each actor. The ex 
ante expectation of a payoff affects the strategies employed by actors; the ex post 
realization of payoffs is information that may influence strategies if there are 
subsequent occurrences of the action situation. The outcome is evaluated according 
to some criteria on an individual or collective basis. When dealing with common pool 
resources, the criteria may be related to economic efficiency, it may be related to 
distributional equity, it may be related to a moral imperative, it may be a question of 
accountability, or it may facilitate a desirable institutional attribute such as flexibility 
(Ostrom, 1999). Action situations may occur once, a defined number of times, or an 
indefinite number of times.  Repeated situations have bearing on strategies 
employed by actors, information flows, outcomes and payoffs. An action situation is 
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Figure 2. Elements of the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework 
The actors in the action situation have four characteristics. First is their 
information gathering and processing capabilities, bound by their experience, 
expertise, and capacity. Depending on the actor, some information will be salient 
while other information is “noise.” Second, the actors are characterized by a set of 
preferences. They may be utility-maximizers or they may be satisficers; they may be 
risk-tolerant or risk-averse; they may prefer to cooperate or compete; they may value 
different outcomes in different ways. Third, actors employ decision criteria to select a 
course of action. Those decision criteria may vary in their degree of rationality or 
may be subject to some of the biases presented earlier. They may employ heuristics 
and simple frameworks or they may employ more sophisticated criteria. They may 
decide based on appropriateness or based on outcome. Finally, actors bring 
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may be fishing boats or groundwater wells; in a public policy arena, it may be 
empirical analysis or political leverage. The combination of the actor’s characteristics 
and the characteristics of the action situation determine the actor’s strategy at a 
given point in the scenario.  
It was noted earlier that there are external factors affecting the action arena. 
Those include rules-in-use, the attributes of the community, and the attributes of the 
physical world. Rules-in-use or “working rules” are those that are actually considered 
when taking action. Ostrom describes them as “the set of rules to which participants 
would make reference if asked to explain and justify their actions to fellow 
participants” (1999, p. 51). Thus, rules-in-use may not conform to the formal 
standard operating procedures, regulations, and laws that are supposed to drive 
behavior; instead, they are the rules informed by such formal prescriptions, but 
modified by the norms of the community or communities the actor represents. In an 
acquisition context, rules-in-use capture not what the regulations say a program 
manager should do, but what CAPT John Doe—a naval officer, an aviator, a 
member of a particular systems command and PEO, who happens to be a program 
manager—thinks ought to be done. The actor’s assessment of the expected payoff 
of an action includes any rewards for following rules and sanctions for violating 
them. 
Rules come in three basic forms: those that prohibit action, those that require 
action and those that permit action. There are also seven types of rules, according to 
Ostrom (1999): rules for exit and entry, position, scope, authority, aggregation, 
information, and payoffs (1999, pp. 52-53). As the aim of this paper is to improve 
acquisition outcomes through effective policy interventions, policy-makers would be 
well-served to understand the various types of rules and how they impact the 
choices of actors.   
Further affecting the action arena are the characteristics of the physical world 
in which, and about which, the actions take place. These attributes determine what 
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government, it may be helpful to re-label this the characteristics of the political world. 
Defense budgets, for example, are not solely the creation of the Defense 
Department, but are heavily influenced by external actors and events such as 
congressional budget processes and military operational contingencies.  
Lastly, the action arena is influenced by the attributes of the community. It 
was already noted that the rules-in-use are affected by the community but so too are 
the strategies, preferences, and desired outcomes. The response of the community 
determines what behaviors are acceptable. They determine the degree of 
homogeneity of preferences and values among the actors (Ostrom, 1999). 
A final attribute of the framework is that action arenas are interconnected. For 
instance, there may be a set of serially connected arenas of incremental decisions 
where the output of one arena becomes information available to another, changes 
the payoffs in another, or establishes new rules for another. The latter example is 
common in hierarchical organizations, such as the DoD. An action arena at a high 
level of the organization that determines questions of process or provides guidance 
on organizational objectives establishes a condition for an action arena at a lower 
level. Ostrom (1999) describes three levels of rule-making: operational rules that 
directly affect routine decisions, collective-choice rules that affect operational 
activities by determining who is eligible to participate and the rules for changing 
operational rules, and constitutional-choice rules that affect who and how collective-
choice rules are made (p. 44). As Gailey and Lee (2007) noted, culture was a 
mediating mechanism between layers; the IAD framework permits such layered 
analysis. 
The Value of the Framework    
The framework is quite powerful in that it permits the application or testing of 
individual and group behavior theories. It permits the analysis of action scenarios 
across multiple layers. The interconnectedness of action arenas and rules makes 
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prescriptions since those prescriptions normally take the form of new collective-
choice or operational rules. How does it do that? The framework facilitates the 
prediction of outcomes by either modeling structured, predictable situations, or by 
inferring outcomes from lessons learned in field research.   
The framework has been successfully employed to study the management of 
common pool resources and, as explained in Appendix 1, the defense budget has 
many of the same characteristics as common pool resources. It has been used in 
other government applications such as the study of corruption, mentioned earlier, 
and to examine the allocation of health resources in state governments. There is 
ample evidence to suggest it should also apply to defense acquisition. 
In a public budgeting context, possible research questions the framework can 
address include: 
 Are resource allocation decisions affected by the presence of non-
rational biases, such as those prospect theory would lead one to 
expect? 
 Are resource re-allocation decisions affected by Thaler’s “mental 
accounting”? 
 What heuristics and frames are used by resource allocation decision-
makers? 
 What preferences do the decision-makers bring to the action arena? 
Do they seek increasing budgets, sufficient budgets, or balanced 
budgets?  How do they differ among roles? 
 What rules-in-use exist that contravene the prescribed rules? How is 
deviant behavior, such as “strategic misrepresentation,” justified? 
 What action arenas determine the rules for the resource allocation 
arena? 
 What changes in strategy occur in successive rounds as knowledge of 
program performance increases? Does that differ if the program is 
successful or unsuccessful? 
Given the answers to such “what” questions, researchers may explore the “how” 
questions, seeking to understand the underlying processes. With that knowledge 
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decisions are made given a set of “what,” changes to a particular “what” should 
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Applying the IAD Framework to Defense 
Acquisition 
 In practice, however, these processes and practitioners often operate 
independent of one another.  Uncoordinated changes in each of the 
processes often cause unintended negative consequences that 
magnify the effects of disruptions in any one area. Incompatible 
behaviors often result because organizational values differ among 
process owners and participants. DAPA Report (2006, p. 5) 
 
Introduction and Methodology    
In that short passage from the DAPA Report, many of the elements of the IAD 
framework are present: actors, roles, interactions, payoffs, outcomes, strategies, etc. 
This section of the paper illustrates the framework by applying it to defense 
acquisition at a summary level. The actors in this illustration are not individuals; 
rather, they are systems: the PPBE system, the defense acquisition system, and the 
JCIDS (requirements) system. The action arena is the interaction of those actors 
and others as they determine the allocation of resources for a portfolio of acquisition 
programs. The arena is not a particular meeting or decision forum; rather, the 
process as it exists broadly.  
The model is populated from the results of a content analysis of recent 
studies of the cost growth problem in defense acquisition. The data set included 
reports from the Government Accountability Office and Congressional Research 
Service, the 2006 Defense Acquisition Program Assessment Report, CSIS and 
RAND cost growth studies, the USD(AT&L) Acquisition Transformation Report, and 
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program (QSR NVivo®), the diagnostic portions of the studies2 were coded 
according to the elements of the IAD framework by two researchers. Coding reports 
were run for each element of the framework and a narrative developed from those 
reports. What follows is that narrative. 
The Actors   
Budgeting and resource allocation decisions for a given program or portfolio 
of programs involves interactions among several actors. This section describes 
those actors and, in the process, illuminates the elements of the framework 
associated with actors and roles: their preferences, information gathering and 
processing capabilities, decision criteria, and the resources they bring to bear on the 
actions in the action arena. 
The first actor is the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 
(PPBE) System.  PPBE seeks to create a balanced budget; one that best meets the 
needs of those who define military requirements in a fashion that strategically 
balances current and future readiness, while conforming to fiscal guidance and 
appropriation law, while remaining politically viable. Consistency is an overarching 
virtue in budgeting and the tendency is to make incremental, not dramatic, changes 
from year to year. A common refrain among programmers is that “money in motion is 
money at risk,” implying a preference that recognizes political rather than economic 
bases or reallocation. 
PPBE relies on many disparate and sometimes conflicting information 
sources. Strategy documentation and operational plans dictate the desired force 
structure that must be tempered with technological feasibility, programmatic 
executability, and funding limits. Information is considered in a multi-dimensional 
                                            
2 Only the portions of the studies that described or diagnosed defense acquisition were coded. 
Recommendations, forecasts, or policy prescriptions, were not. The intent was to gather descriptive 
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space defined by military department, major force program, mission capability 
area/capability portfolio, appropriation, and fiscal year. Balance is sought among all 
dimensions, and all dimensions have dedicated sponsors or advocates except the 
fiscal year. Thus, there is only a diffused resistance to defer plans, move expenses, 
create outyear “wedges,” and draw out schedules. The DAPA Report found,  
Those who hold the budget purse strings reduce annual Research 
Development Testing and Evaluation, Procurement, and Operations and 
Maintenance for Program budgets to ensure that all the acquisition funding 
accounts fit within the “top-line” President’s Budget.  This results in causing 
some programs to be “un-executable” at the expense of others, essentially 
borrowing from one to pay for another. (2006, p. 23)  
While GAO notes, “With too many programs underway for the available resources 
[…] DoD must make up for the funding shortfalls by shifting funds from one program 
to pay for another, reducing system capabilities, cutting procurement quantities, 
stretching out programs” (Francis, 2009, p. 6). 
PPBE is calendar-driven. A timely bad decision is better than a tardy good 
decision. Phases overlap within a given fiscal year cycle and fiscal year cycles 
overlap. Preliminary work began on POM-12 before the fiscal year 2010 budget was 
completed, both of which affected the work of program review 2011 and the 
associated Quadrennial Defense Review. Because multiple budgets are in progress 
at varying stages of development, funding issues may be resolved in any one of 
them, not necessarily the one that best matches the needs of the particular program. 
Those engaged in the process know that mistakes may be corrected in either the 
next cycle or during subsequent steps of the current cycle. No budget is ever cast in 
iron: programs evolve into budgets into appropriations into apportionments into 
allocations and reallocations that are sometimes even reprogrammed.  
The phases are not neatly sequential and, in many cases, are 
organizationally disjointed with planners, programmers, and budgeters residing in 
different organizations. Those planners, programmers and budgeters analyze issues 
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different decision-making heuristics (Havens, 1983). This inhibits the quality of 
information flow, understanding, and integrity of the process, while increasing 
conflict. 
To the PPBE system, success is defined by both outcomes and process. A 
successful outcome is a reasonably well-balanced budget that seems to meet the 
needs of the most salient stakeholders and one that has a high likelihood of being 
approved by Congress. The process is successful if the salient stakeholders’ voices 
are heard and considered.  There is a bias to support the warfighter and “rather than 
limit the number and size of programs or adjust requirements, the funding process 
attempts to accommodate programs” (Francis, 2009, p. 6). 
The second actor is the Defense Acquisition System (DAS). The DAS seeks 
to deliver defined military capability, ideally within reasonable cost and schedule 
parameters. The program office is at the nexus of demands by the military 
requirements process, contractual relationships with the commercial sector, and 
resources obtained through PPBE and legislative rocesses. 
Programs are routinely managed by individuals who have practical 
experience with systems similar to the one being acquired. Programs are often 
grouped with like programs, with oversight by senior executives familiar with those 
types of systems. For example, fighter aircraft programs are often managed by pilots 
and within program executive offices comprised of other tactical aircraft programs. 
Thus, a particular military department warfighter subculture influences a given 
program management office.  
The DAS is an event-driven system, characterized by phases, milestones, 
and gates. The program moves to the next phase only after having demonstrated an 
acceptable level of progress in the last phase and only after scrutiny by a series of 
reviewers. Significant program leadership attention is drawn to the process of 
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the gate or milestone process. Both come at the expense of attention paid to direct 
program management. 
DAS programs have significant technical considerations. Many programs 
exist in order to obtain or maintain a competitive advantage over the nation’s 
adversaries. Technologies are rarely mature at program initiation—posing a 
challenge for planners and estimators.  Over time, as technology matures and 
desires evolve, plans adjust accordingly (Chadwick, 2007). 
The program office relies on the commercial sector as their agent in 
developing those technologies: creating the plans, and bringing everything together 
into effective systems. This is a classic agency situation with conflicting goals and 
asymmetric information. Some of the information held by the contractor is vitally 
important to the program manager’s efforts to obtain resources and other support. 
Depending on the materiality of defense acquisition programs, they may have 
significant political support, divided support, or surprisingly little support. Program 
managers view their role as advocates and seek to maximize political support while 
minimizing intrusive oversight. The nation’s choice to invest in an acquisition system 
is subject to policy analysis like any other public policy decision. In the requirements 
process inside the DoD, costs and benefits are measured largely in military terms; in 
a political setting, the calculus necessarily includes other variables and 
constituencies beyond the warfighter matter. In an effort to obtain requisite support, 
the program office becomes sensitive to those concerns.  
Managing the range of costs in pursuit of the range of benefits is at the heart 
of program management. But, program managers also find themselves in a situation 
where accountability is sketchy; the link between rewards and performance is 
attenuated, and authorities and responsibilities are not aligned. “Program managers 
cannot be held accountable when the programs they are handed already have a low 
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decisions since they have little control over funding, cannot veto new requirements, 
and they have little authority over staffing” (Sullivan, 2008, pp. 8-9). 
The third actor within the DoD is the requirements generation and validation 
process: the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). Unlike 
PPBE and the DAS, JCIDS is relatively unconstrained by financial resources. 
Analyses of alternatives are based more on effectiveness than efficiency.  When 
efficiency is considered, the costs of inputs measured in time, manpower, weight, 
distance, lethality, survivability, reliability, reach and other military factors are far 
more important than costs measured in dollars or budget authority. Indeed, the 
functional solutions analysis phase of the process considers the combination of 
doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and 
facilities (DOTMLPF). Conspicuously absent is consideration of financial impact. 
The JCIDS is focused on the gaps between existing capabilities and those 
desired by the combatant commanders. There is an inherent bias in the system to 
acquire more things to fill in those gaps. The nature of a military is that it desires to 
always be more capable and more ready. The requirements are generated by 
portions of the DoD organization that do not have responsibility for either budgeting 
or acquisition management, thus exacerbating the desire for more. Therefore, 
desires tend to stress the capacity of the PPBE and DAS. 
The JCIDS generally interfaces with the DAS with an initial capabilities 
document at milestone A, a capability development document at milestone B, and a 
capability production document at milestone C. These documents provide validation 
of the military essentiality of the system and the thresholds and objectives of 
technical performance for the system. The JCIDS interfaces with PPBE through the 
issuance of planning and programming guidance before the POM and budget are 
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With respect to resources and information, the JCIDS represents the voice of 
the “warfighter.” This role is most influential regarding the military utility and value of 
the requirement. This is the supported role where the DAS and PPBE are the 
supporting roles. The DAS and PPBE feel a responsibility to support the 
requirements defined by the JCIDS, sometimes too much so: “Program teams allow 
requirements to escalate without discipline, thereby driving costs beyond baseline 
budget and schedule” (Kadish et al., 2006, p. 5). 
Finally, other actors in this action arena that will eventually determine the 
level of funding for various programs include the Congress and the portion of the for-
profit commercial sector that will build and support the systems. “The primary 
mechanism for which Congress has exercised its legislative powers to improve the 
performance of the defense acquisition structure on a recurring basis has generally 
been the annual National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs), though annual 
Appropriations Acts still exert significant influence via Congress’ power of the purse” 
(Chadwick, 2007, p. 29).  Program quantities and funding levels are reviewed, 
approved or modified on an annual basis, between cycles of internal defense 
budgeting. Oversight is maintained by legislative staffs and support agencies. 
Congress is interested in seeing a capable and affordable military on a collective 
level and in supporting constituent interests on a local level. Serving the former can 
come at a cost to the latter and vice-versa. Similar to the trade-offs, compromise, 
and risk management inherent inside the DoD’s resource allocation decision system, 
there are trade-offs, compromise, and risk management in the legislature. Congress 
also weighs the defense program against the other 80% of federal spending, a 
consideration not present inside the DoD. Thus, the decision process for Congress 
must attend to matters that are both local and national, as well as matters inside and 
outside the DoD. 
Among the constituent interests of Congress are the businesses and 
employees of the businesses they represent. Those businesses that are defense 
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powerful position in that they hold the capability to design, manufacture and support 
the desired systems. That information is necessary to the process of estimating 
costs and budgeting based on those estimates. These corporations may be 
motivated by any combination of factors: market share, cash flow, profit margin, 
technological leadership, or technology transition to non-military lines of business. 
The relationship between the DoD and the contractors is more arms-length when 
competition is present and more cooperative in a sole-source setting. Actor 
strategies are affected by the allocation of risks and rewards by contract type. Many 
corporations hire managers and executives with military backgrounds, but the DoD 
has very few with corporate experience, other than the occasional political 
appointee. These corporations also have a relationship with members of Congress 
as do their subcontractors. The corporations are free to approach and lobby 
Congress in ways the DoD is not.  
In sum, the values of the actors clearly differ. As the DAPA report 
summarized:  
Organizations providing oversight and coordination of “little a” acquisition 
activities value compliance, consistency of approach and control of program 
activities. The budget process values how much and when to buy and 
focuses on control and oversight to balance the instability that advocacy 
creates. The requirements process values the “why” and “what to buy,” 
focusing on obtaining the ability to achieve mission success and to protecting 
the life of the warfighter. The “little a” acquisition process values “how to buy,” 
striving to balance cost, schedule and performance.  For industry, the critical 
issue is survival, followed by predictability in the defense market segment and 
achieving stockholder confidence. (Kadish et al., 2006, p. 5)   
When these values collide, there may be cooperation or there may be 
competition; there may be understanding or dismissal; there will certainly be different 
strategies employed by the various actors in the action situation. Kadish et al., found 
That the budget, requirements and acquisition processes function in a 
framework that is bound by process practitioners and stakeholders […] In this 
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behaviors that drive the budget, acquisition and requirements processes 
apart—processes that need to be in harmony for the System to work. (2006, 
p. 23)    
The Action Situation  
The process of allocating resources for a given program or portfolio of 
programs involves interactions among all the actors described above. This section 
describes those interactions and, in the process, illuminates the elements of the 
action situation: production functions, payoffs, information, actions, and outcomes.  
Over time, multiple interactions of subsets of actors share information, 
strategize, or make preliminary decisions. These interactions result in an allocation 
of funds to a program at a point in time and further (re)allocations at subsequent 
points in time. There is not one decision, rather a series of decisions that occur on a 
regularly recurring basis.3  
While funding decisions occur on a regular, annual cycle, the requirements for 
the military systems persist and evolve on no set schedule, and acquisition 
programs are event driven. As adversaries develop capabilities, and as technologies 
mature or are discovered, requirements continually evolve. Given the inherent bias 
towards more capability and more readiness, there is increasing demand for 
program output and the associated demand for funds. The calendar-driven 
budgeting cycle must not only attempt to forecast the changes in requirements, it 
must also forecast the timing of programmatic milestones. 
Individual service members rotate between roles within the PPBE, DAS, and 
JCIDS processes. Former warfighters become budgeters or program managers; 
today’s budgeter may become tomorrow’s warfighter. Because of this, the actors 
                                            
3 Certainly one could look at each of these interactions as separate action arenas, and a detailed 
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within the PPBE and DAS roles feel an obligation to support the general warfighter 
or a particular internal sub-culture. CSIS reported such intra-service tension: “Much 
of the Air Force’s prioritization is also due to organizational politics and the 
secondary importance of unmanned space vehicles in the Air Force that results from 
it. There are few incentives for advocates of such programs in an organization that is 
run by fighter pilots and exhibits a reward structure strongly biased towards the latter 
career track” (Kaiser & Cordesman, 2008, p. 13). Frequent turnover of personnel 
also limits their experience and expertise:  
Key Department of Defense acquisition personnel who are responsible for 
requirements, budget and acquisition do not have sufficient experience, 
tenure and training to meet current acquisition challenges. Personnel stability 
in these key positions is not sufficient to develop or maintain adequate 
understanding of programs and program issues. (Kadish et al., 2006, p. 29)  
There is a bias toward short-term objectives. The risk of promising more in 
the short run at the expense of long-range stability is not personally significant since 
these decisions affect events years in the future. Resource allocation decision cycles 
are lengthy and a decision during the building of a POM occurs one to two years 
before the funds are appropriated and allocated to the program and effects manifest 
even later, quite likely after individual actors have changed roles. Because of the 
perceived high reward for supporting the requirement and the low cost of assuming 
the risk of underfunding, there is a tendency to underfund one program in order to 
make another program possible. The assumed risk carries less cost than the 
perceived benefit of supporting the marginal requirement.  
In the case of a system that has lukewarm political support, but strong military 
support, incentives exist to under-represent the cost. All things being equal, a 
program is more attractive politically if it appears to cost less. “A new weapon 
system is not likely to be approved unless it promises the best capability and 
appears affordable within forecasted available funding levels” (Sullivan, 2008, p. 8). 
Gaining initial approval is relatively more difficult than adjusting the price of the 
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vested interest.  “It is one challenge to defend the continuation of an ongoing 
program in the annual defense budget; it is quite another to add such controversial 
and costly programs to a budget already under pressure” (Kaiser & Cordesman, 
2008, p. 14). 
Exacerbating this bias is the tendency among industry partners to 
underestimate the cost of the program to either ensure its political viability or to 
secure the winning contract—or both. Early in a program’s lifecycle, when there is 
relatively more uncertainty, a lower estimate will generate support and is difficult to 
refute. The risk of a low estimate is mitigated in the presence of a cost-plus contract, 
the fact that budgets are revisited annually, and the degree of legislative support for 
the program or the company. 
The DAPA report referred to the reinforcing pressures to underestimate costs 
that exist both inside and outside the DoD the “conspiracy of hope” (Kadish et al., 
2006, p. 102).  Moderating this behavior is the goal within PPBE to balance the 
budget and to deliver an executable program that is politically viable. Gross 
misstatements of cost will be met with hostility by Congress and will create a bow 
wave of problems that future budgets must resolve. The professionalism of the 
actors within PPBE moderates the risk but does not eliminate it. The frequent 
presence of “budget wedges” attests to the fact that such bow waves are knowingly 
created and allocation problems are intentionally deferred to future cycles. When 
budgets are stressed, schedules are stretched out and quantities are reduced, 
driving up per unit costs of systems.  
Program managers refer to the triple constraint of cost, schedule and 
technical performance. Sometimes a little performance is sacrificed in a context of 
tight budgets and underestimation takes a different form.  
Requirements are occasionally scaled back without associated cost 
avoidance (or savings) being reported. This typically occurs at the time of a 
program rebaseline, during the major development phase, or when some 
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anticipated performance of such components is close to that originally 
specified, a decision is often made to slightly relax the original requirement 
rather than incur additional cost and schedule slippage to achieve the original 
specification. The effect of relaxing requirements without reporting associated 
cost avoidance is the underestimation of the cost to meet the original 
requirement. (Bolten et al., 2008, p. 18)   
Such decisions drive up the cost per unit of capability but are rarely recorded 
as cost growth since no additional budget authority was requested. 
Further moderating the underestimating behavior is the desire within the DAS 
to fully resource a program to ease the challenge of managing the program to its 
desired outcome. Program managers usually prefer more funds to fewer for a given 
project as a tool to mitigate programmatic risk. The program manager’s estimate, 
however, is largely based on the input from the corporate partner who is likely to 
estimate low at the beginning of a program to ensure contract award and political 
support and is incented to estimate high later in production when they are the sole 
source in order to improve cash flow and profitability. The program manager, in an 
asymmetric information environment and not in control of his own resource stream, 
is at a disadvantage and is not fully capable of avoiding the seemingly inevitable 
cost growth. 
Supporting the DAS is the independent, cost-estimating community. They 
attempt to moderate the effect of the biases to under-represent cost by not having a 
vested interest in the outcome. Their goal is to provide as honest and independent 
an assessment as possible, but that is not without risk. Their estimates are 
information that is available to all actors in the action arena, but no actor is required 
to exactly follow the estimate. Further, estimates may be stochastic, providing 
considerable room for debate regarding the appropriate level of funding and risk. 
“Department requirements to budget programs to the most probable cost are 
routinely interpreted to apply only to the budget years” (Kadish et al., 2006, p. 53).  
Still, a decision to fund a program at a level that deviates significantly from the 
estimate invites scrutiny. Limiting the moderating effect of the independent cost 
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often does not perform the proper up-front analysis to determine whether its needs 
can be met, significant contract cost increases can occur as the scope of the 
requirements change or become better understood by the government and 
contractor” (Sullivan, 2008, p. 7). Some argue that the incomplete knowledge is 
biased optimistically: “programs are started without knowing what resources will truly 
be needed and are managed with lower levels of product knowledge at critical 
junctures than expected under best practices standards. In the absence of such 
knowledge, managers rely heavily on assumptions about system requirements, 
technology, and design maturity, which are consistently too optimistic” (Sullivan, 
2008, p. 2).  Finally, the cost-estimating community prides itself on its independence 
but “enormous pressure can be placed on the cost analysts to create optimistic 
estimates so that the proposed program will not be viewed as too expensive to move 
forward as currently specified” (Bolten et al., 2008, p. 17). 
Once Congress is engaged in the process, their additional considerations 
may affect the economics of a program. For example, building limited quantities of 
ships in multiple shipyards appeals to wider constituencies and may be the most 
politically expedient and locally responsible thing to do, but it dampens the rate of 
progress along learning curves and increases transaction and overhead costs which 
drives up per unit acquisition costs. To certain members of Congress the local payoff 
exceeds the national cost. 
The action arena, as noted, is a series of incremental decisions. After the 
budget is built and after Congress appropriates the funds, there is still a question of 
execution. It is common for programs to receive less than their full allocations from 
the appropriation because of legislative provisions that are assessed against all 
programs, and for local “taxes” to create management reserves or discretionary 
accounts. Such actions reduce the funding available to a program that was already 
budgeted at a risky level. “Variability between annual budget predictions and the 
ultimate budget authority makes program planning difficult” (Kadish et al., 2006, p. 
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the government decides that the proposed quantity is too expensive and must 
therefore be cut, that more system units are required, or that the initial or current 
quantity is no longer justifiable, for any number of reasons” (Bolten et al., 2008, p. 
18).  Among the series of incremental decisions are those to rebaseline programs, 
which reduce the visibility of cost performance. 
The action arena also consists of repeated reviews of budgets and programs, 
many of which are perceived to have little value or may even conflict with other 
reviews. “According to 97 percent of the input that we received, the current oversight 
and leadership process is deficient.  Existing oversight relies upon overlapping 
layers of reviews and reviewers at the expense of quality and focus” (Kadish et al., 
2006, p. 25).  An abundance of rules causes confusion and raises the overhead  
program costs, and it raises the cost of information for overseers. Many of the review 
bodies are also organizationally distinct from the budgeting and program 
management processes leading to a situation where “responsibility and 
accountability are blurred since none of these review bodies are accountable for the 
impact of the imposed changes” (p. 25).  
By way of summary of the action arena, the GAO reported,  
DoD largely continues to define war fighting needs and make 
investment decisions on a service-by-service basis, and assess these 
requirements and their funding implications under separate decision-
making processes. While DoD’s requirements process provides a 
framework for reviewing and validating needs, it does not adequately 
prioritize those needs and is not agile enough to meet changing 
warfighter demands. Ultimately, the process produces more demand 
for new programs than available resources can support. This 
imbalance promotes an unhealthy competition for funds that 
encourages programs to pursue overly ambitious capabilities, develop 
unrealistically low cost estimates and optimistic schedules, and to 
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Exogenous Factors    
Among the most important elements outside the action arena are the rules 
that govern it. It is here that the value of such a framework for policy prescriptions is 
apparent.  Laws, policies, regulations, instructions and memos litter the acquisition 
landscape. There is no shortage of guidance on how to manage an acquisition 
program. On close inspection, much of the guidance permits flexibility and 
encourages programs to adapt to their unique circumstances. Other guidance is 
more constraining and limits program and budget actions. “While the former 
Department of Defense Directive 5000.2R has been reissued as a ‘guidebook’, it 
effectively remains a compliance document, forcing all programs to adopt a similar 
architecture and comply with a similar set of processes” (Kadish et al., 2006, p. 49). 
The set of rules is constantly changing. The JCIDS instruction alone went 
from version “C” in 2003 to version “G” in 2009; nearly one major change per year. 
In the face of persistent change, actors may become confused, weary, 
nonconformist, or they may waste effort attempting to keep up. “Changes in 
acquisition instructions, policies and mandates are applied to programs that are 
already baselined, without consideration for cost or schedule impact” (p. 49). 
Some rules are ineffective: “numerous reports of cost, schedule and/or 
performance failures in acquisition programs and practices […] occurred despite 
efforts to mitigate them, such as revisions to DOD’s defense acquisition policy 
documents, reports and recommendations of numerous Commissions, Studies 
and/or Panels, and efforts to simplify and streamline defense acquisition processes” 
(Chadwick, 2007, p. 2).  CSIS observed that “the Nunn-McCurdy Act has been 
applied anything but rigorously to current and recent procurement programs” (Kaiser 
& Cordesman, 2008, p. 10). 
Other rules are too strictly applied, forfeiting their intended effect. For 
example, oversight varies depending on cost estimate of program, not program risk. 
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million program out of control.  “The rigidity of the Acquisition Category designation 
process and its single focus on program cost results in an excessive number of 
programs requiring Defense Acquisition Board review” (Kadish et al., 2006, p. 24). 
Along with the formal, written rules are the multitudes of rules-in-use that are 
implicit. Not as much is said about those since they have not been the subject of 
much research4. We see some hints of those rules in the preferences and biases 
described in the action arena. There is ample anecdotal evidence that promotions 
for senior officers and executives are based more on having experienced acquisition 
rather than having done it well. Some program managers of major acquisition 
programs who have suffered significant cost growth and schedule slips have been 
promoted to flag and general officer rank. Budget officers who reprogram dollars and 
insert “wedges” are viewed as problem solvers rather than problem creators when 
only the primary impact is considered. 
Such personnel policies are largely driven by the fact that the budgeting and 
acquisition communities generally do not promote, the warfighter subcultures do. It is 
a situation where aviators promote aviators who happen to be program managers, 
thereby getting a good aviator who knows something about acquisition on the team. 
It is not a situation in which program managers promote program managers who 
happen to be aviators to ensure good program managers are on the team who have 
some knowledge of aviation. Thus, an actor’s community norms will impact the 
decision processes and strategies in the action arena. 
Evaluation of Outcomes    
This study is primarily concerned with cost growth, yet we find that not all 
programs suffer cost growth. A statistically improbable number of programs come in 
on schedule and at cost.  “The data are clearly skewed positively, i.e., the majority of 
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programs stretch […] This was to be expected, knowing the conventional wisdom 
[…] It was unusual, however, that so many programs finished precisely on time. 
[suggesting] that finishing on time may be so important that programs are tempted to 
declare completion and rely upon follow-on work to fix errors in the ‘shipped 
product’” (Coleman, Summerville, & Dameron, 2003, pp. 118-119). 
Outcomes are not neutral; they are subject to scrutiny and interpretation, and 
reflect on the actors involved. Self-reflection by the systems involved is common.   
“For nearly 60 years, the Department of Defense has been engaged in a continuous 
process of self assessment to identify and improve the way it acquires weapons 
systems” (Kadish et al., 2006, p. 1).  Unfortunately, “poor outcomes—delays, cost 
growth, and reduced quantities—have been persistent for decades” (Francis, 2009, 
p. 12) leading one to question the efficacy of the evaluations and the feedback 
mechanisms.  
While this paper is focused on problems, defense acquisition has hardly been 
a failure. The U.S. military has assembled a tremendously potent fighting force and 
can claim military superiority in nearly any conceived situation. For the warfighter, 
acquisition processes have been successful; slow sometimes, but largely 
successful. Outcomes can be assessed along several performance parameters 
(e.g., lethality, survivability, reliability, in addition to cost and schedule) and because 
the performance record is mixed across those measures, the signals fed back into 
the action arenas are mixed. Given the complexity of the environment for acquisition, 
it is difficult to isolate blame if something goes wrong, thus “DoD officials are rarely 
held accountable for these poor outcomes and the acquisition environment does not 
provide the appropriate incentives for contractors to stay within cost and schedule 
targets” (Sullivan, 2008, p. 2).   
In the public arena, when signs of disorder are present, there is a bias to “do 
something”. We find “all levels react by becoming more involved, applying more 
oversight and often making budget, schedule or adjustment of requirements that 
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al., 2006, p. 23). These actions can create a reinforcing loop that exacerbates 
problems. Within that loop actors have learned through experience and the norms of 
the institution “that DoD’s implied definition of success is to attract funds for new 
programs and to keep funds for ongoing programs, no matter what the impact” 
(Sullivan, 2008, p. 14). 
Summary      
As this is being written, the newly confirmed Undersecretary of Defense 
(Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) is proposing new rules. A Defense Science 
Board report suggests new rules. The House Armed Services Committee has 
created a Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform that will report recommendations for 
possible legislation to improve outcomes.  All of the new rules are based on the 
same type of analysis that has been conducted for decades. There is no more 
reason to expect these new rules to affect outcomes any more than the last few 
dozen rule changes have affected outcomes. Most of these rules are based in the 
legal-rational authority of bureaucracies; few, if any, are based in the value-rational 
perspective of professional organizations with strong cultures. The next section 
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A Suggested Research Agenda 
In December 2007, the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics) tasked the Defense Science Board to look at human dynamics in 
warfare. The tasking memo created a Task Force on Understanding Adversaries 
because the DoD “needs to understand the adversary and host population social 
structure, culture, motivations, beliefs and interests that contribute to behavioral 
actions and responses. This understanding is necessary to recognize behavioral 
patterns and gain influence in interactions” (DSB, 2009, p. 117). If it is necessary to 
understand such factors to predict and influence behavior and response among the 
U.S.’s adversaries, does it not stand to reason that such factors must also be 
explored to understand and influence behavior among the actors in other contexts, 
such as defense acquisition?    
Just as the DSB noted the insufficiency of the DoD’s capabilities with respect 
to human dynamics—“outdated and insufficient training of military personnel and key 
advisors […] with respect to cultural studies, dynamic network analysis, and human 
dynamic models and simulations” (2009, p. xiv) —gaps remain in the body of 
knowledge concerning the management of defense acquisition.  A significant gap is 
an understanding of the institutional forces that affect acquisition outcomes. To 
create that understanding, a new approach to studying the problems of defense is 
needed that considers these additional factors.  The USD(AT&L) should create a 
parallel task force for the understanding of human dynamics in defense acquisition 
that specifically maps cultural forces and rules-in-use, using computational and 
laboratory tools to analyze the dynamics of the processes that define, fund, and 
manage acquisition programs. Without such understanding, effective policy 
interventions will remain elusive. If the DSB is correct in stating that “cultural 
insensitivity is militarily dysfunctional” (2009, p. xii) then it is not too far a leap to 
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organizational behavior has long linked the understanding of organizational culture 
to performance (Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1981; Denison, 1990; Schein, 2004).  
What follows is the outline of a research agenda that should begin to fill the 
gap in knowledge. The agenda consists of both field work and 
computational/laboratory experimentation through models. The field work consists of 
qualitative research to increase understanding of institutional factors such as rules-
in-use and community norms. Such understanding is then used to create models 
that represent current environments and behavior. Those models are then taken to 
the field for validation. Upon validation, models are used to assess the likely impact 
of changes to exogenous factors, viz. new rules. Such experimentation allows the 
policy-setters to test the efficacy and to assess the secondary effects of policy 
options.  
Field Research     
Field research is necessary for three reasons.  First, while there are extant 
studies on the culture of the military, there are not studies (to the author’s 
knowledge) on the culture of defense requirements generation and validation, 
defense acquisition, or defense programming and budgeting. Employing the IAD 
framework can generate research questions about the institution of defense 
acquisition in manageable segments of work.  Data can be collected about defense 
acquisition and analyzed within the elements of the IAD framework. Research 
questions to be answered by field work may include: 
 According to the actors, what action arenas are most salient in 
affecting cost growth? (E.g., are the compromises inherent in building 
the POM more influential than the stature of an independent cost 
estimate?) 
 What are the rules-in-use for a given action arena?  (E.g., if decisions 
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 To what communities are the actors beholden? (E.g., does a military 
department affect a person’s decisions on joint programs?) 
 What incentives, rewards, or sanctions do the various communities use 
to enforce the rules? (E.g., are future promotions based on the prestige 
of programs, the mere fact that a person has acquired program 
management experience, or the performance of the program?) 
 How are decision-makers affected by the multiple roles in which they 
serve? (E.g., what does it mean to be a program manager or resource 
sponsor who is also an aviator or submariner?) 
Second, field work is necessary in collecting data to test hypotheses about 
defense acquisition that stem from theories of individual and group behavior that 
originated in different contexts: 
 From behavioral finance, do budget reallocation decisions by resource 
managers in the DoD typify the mental accounting behaviors theorized 
by Thayer? Is the tendency to accept risk in some areas and not others 
consistent with Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory?  
 From group decision-making, are decisions affecting cost and funding 
based on their appropriateness, as March (1994) suggests, or based 
on expectations of utility-maximizing outcomes? What are the mental 
models and heuristics that guide information search, interpretation, and 
decisions? 
 From organizational failure, do particular programs exhibit the factors 
associated with permanent failure that Meyer and Zucker (1989) 
documented, and, if so, do they follow a similar process? Does 
strategic misrepresentation occur in defense acquisition like it does in 
municipal public works projects, as demonstrated by Flyvbjerg’s 
studies)? 
Both the first and second reasons for field work generate a level of external 
validity as the research moves into the laboratory and computational environments. 
The actual behaviors and rules-in-use uncovered in the field should be used to 
construct models of organizational behavior. The laboratory and computational 
experimentation is described in the next section, but it is in that environment where 
alternative policy prescriptions can be assessed for their likely impact. 
The third reason for field research is to validate the predictions that result 
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developed in the laboratory, they should be taken back to the field for validation. 
This can occur prospectively by surveying actors associated with defense acquisition 
to gauge the policies’ face validity. This can also occur retrospectively after policies 
are enacted to assess whether the model accurately predicted the outcomes.  
Depending upon the materiality of the policy change, the models may need to be 
updated. 
Experimental and Computational Research    
Earlier in this paper, a comparison was made between the IAD framework as 
applied to common pool resource decision-making and an N-player, multi-round, 
Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) game. PD games have long been studied in laboratory 
settings and one strength of the IAD framework is that it, too, lends itself to such 
modeling, simulation, and gaming. In the book, Rules, Games & Common-Pool 
Resources, Ostrom et al. (1994) show how gaming can be used to understand actor 
strategies and institutional forces. They further show how gaming can be used to 
hypothesize and test the effects of rule changes on the structure and outcomes of 
action situations.  
Such modeling and gaming is not unique to the IAD framework and has 
become widely accepted in related domains. In the seminal issue of the journal 
Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Carley (1995) describes 
such work as focusing “on developing and testing organizational theory using formal 
models. The community shares a theoretical view of organizations as collections of 
processes and intelligent adaptive agents that are task oriented, socially situated, 
technologically bound, and continuously changing” (p. 39). Defense acquisition can 
be similarly described and insights should be gained by building computation or 
mathematical models.  
Carley (2009) summarized the state-of-the-art use of computational modeling 
for understanding social behavior and concluded that there are “a plethora of tools 
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model created to support defense acquisition first begin with a solid theoretical 
foundation to inform its design. Carley provides a set of model design considerations 
that are beyond the scope of this paper but would be invaluable to one who would 
pursue this line of research. She also emphasizes the utility of such models for 
decision support and assessing the potential impacts of policy decisions in a cost-
effective and timely manner. 
Other applications of computational tools and techniques for understanding 
organizational behavior are relevant to a study of defense acquisition. The Virtual 
Design Team model created at Stanford University models complex engineering 
projects, not unlike defense acquisition projects. The model is based in contingency 
theory and adopts an information processing view of the actors and their interactions 
in a complex, multidisciplinary series of tasks (Jin & Levitt, 1996).  The Stanford 
team has begun to explore the effects of culture on project performance (Horii, Jin, & 
Levitt, 2005).  
The Virtual Design Team model has already been adapted to military use by 
the Center for Edge Power (CEP). The CEP has adapted the models to increase 
understanding of network-centric command and control structures (Nissen & 
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Conclusion 
Tools of computational modeling currently exist to create a new level of 
understanding of the dynamics of defense acquisition. This paper outlines an 
agenda for research that would employ such tools in conjunction with a proven 
framework that incorporates variables that have been omitted in past studies  and 
are grounded in the theories of behavioral science. The goal is to understand the 
institutional and cultural factors that lead to the types of decisions that too-often 
result in cost growth in defense acquisition projects. New policy prescriptions based 
on existing knowledge have not solved the problem; perhaps taking a rigorous look 
at additional factors will yield fresh insights into an old problem.  
With greater understanding through field work, new rule sets can be 
hypothesized and tested in a computational or laboratory setting to see how 
behaviors, and ultimately outcomes, are affected.  Such tests can be done in a 
timely and cost-effective manner without creating churn, confusion, or change-
weariness within the acquisition workforce. Prospective rules that are found to 
reinforce the status quo in an experiment should be abandoned; those that offer the 
greatest promise of successful reform should be enacted. Understanding the 
behaviors of the actors in defense acquisition, and—more importantly—how those 
behaviors would change in the face of new rules, should make policy-making more 
effective.  Effective in this case means a portfolio of programs that with increasing 
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Appendix 1. The Defense Budget as a Common 
Pool Resource 
The IAD framework has been successfully used to explain the management 
of common pool resources. A common pool resource (CPR) is characterized by two 
factors, it is difficult to exclude someone from using the resource, and the use of the 
resource by one consumer denies its use to another (subtractability). The resource 
is normally renewable, so management of the stocks and flows affected by rates of 
production and consumption is vital.  
 
One example of a common pool resource is a maritime habitat designated as 
a fishing zone. When open to fishing one might expect fishermen to take as much as 
possible, eventually depleting the stock of fish. Economics theory says that the 
interplay of such rational self-interested parties in this situation will result in 
externalities and the Tragedy of the Commons (Harden, 1968).  
I argue that the defense budget (specifically, the allocation of financial 
resources within the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM)) is a common pool 
resource. Since cost growth is fundamentally about comparing the amount of 
funding provided to an acquisition program at a minimum of two points in time, the 
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of defense acquisition are replete with comments that programs are underfunded, 
projections are optimistic, decisions are deferred, growth displaces other investment, 
estimates are low in order to “buy in,” and program managers spend too much time 
acquiring and protecting budgetary resources, all of which suggest that funding 
allocation decisions are a vital concern and actors involved in funding decisions 
employ strategies to affect the outcomes of the decisions. Just because funding is 
critical, though, does not make it a common pool resource. Look at the definition of a 
CPR, and compare it to the defense budget. 
Clearly, the characteristic of subtractability is present. Within a given year’s 
top line, a dollar allocated to one program is a dollar no longer available to another. 
The resource is characterized by stocks and flows: given an appropriation by the 
Congress, there is a stock of budget authority that is spent according to the 
prescribed allocation. Those allocations can change within a budget cycle through 
reprogramming. The stock can be reduced with rescissions or expanded with 
supplemental appropriations. The cycle repeats on roughly an annual basis and the 
claimants on the subsequent year’s flow will change as will the total amount 
available. These characteristics are quite similar to what one would find if looking at 
a managed forest, groundwater supply, or fishing area—things widely considered to 
be CPRs and the focus of previous studies employing the IAD framework.  
Of concern when describing the defense budget as a CPR is the notion of 
excludability. Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker (2004) define this characteristic as “how 
easy or costly it is to exclude or limit potential beneficiaries (users) from consuming 
them once they are provided by nature or through the activities of other individuals” 
(p. 6). It is helpful to note that man-made items qualify as CPRs, such as computer 
processing time or parking garages. It is also important to note that it is not 
necessary for a CPR to be available to any user; reasonable barriers to entry may 
exist. For example, a fishing area is not susceptible to being overfished by everyone, 
only those with sufficient capital to buy a fishing vessel and the requisite knowledge 
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those who have dug a well to capture it. Thus, it is only necessary to state that it is 
difficult to exclude any potential users who have access to the resource. Not 
everyone has access to the defense budget, but approximately 5,000 program 
elements define the budget and those program elements are represented by 
hundreds of advocates, all of whom are participants in the PPBE system, thereby 
giving them access to, and a legitimate claim on, the budget.  
While there are processes for fishing or pumping groundwater, the 
characteristics of the fisherman or pumping statio—along with the rules and 
institutional framework within which they operate—affect the amount of the resource 
they can possibly obtain. Likewise, the attributes of a claimant on the defense 
budge—along with the rules, processes, and institutional factors—affect how much 
one can claim. Granted, not all the claimants for defense resources are infinitely 
greedy and prone to take as much as they can get; likewise, users of a parking 
garage normally only take one (sometimes two!) spaces at a time, computer users 
are not using CPU time perpetually, and fishing boats and water tanks have a 
capacity limit. Different actors will seek to consume differing amounts based on their 
individual needs. All that is necessary to have a CPR situation is that the different 
actors who have access to a resource may stake a claim against that resource and 
that the size of those claims will be based on individual preferences and strategies. 
Ostrom (1994) notes that CPRs are often heterogeneously distributed in “a patchy 
environment in which patches may differ dramatically in yield” (p. 11). Internal DoD 
budget “controls” create a patchiness to the defense budget. 
Further, CPR situations are characterized by both the provision of the 
resource and the allocation of it to users; allocating the flow effectively is the central 
concern. Of defense acquisition, the GAO recently commented, “DoD’s ability to 
allocate funding effectively to programs is largely driven by its acceptance of 
unrealistic cost estimates and a failure to balance needs based on available 
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a finite, but renewable, resource employing strategies in an environment defined by 
institutional norms. 
The idea of a budget as a CPR is not a new. In the Concise Encyclopedia of 
Economics, John Cogan makes the argument that the federal budget deficit is an 
example of the tragedy of the commons (Cogan, 1993). If the defense budget is a 
CPR, then there should be evidence of the ill effects that CPRs tend to produce. Has 
the defense budget been “overfished”?  By some accounts, yes. From 1998 to 2008, 
the Department of the Navy budget grew by almost 50% in real terms, yet the 
number of ships, aircraft and personnel fell by about 15%. DoD-wide, procurement 
and R&D spending has grown from $95 billion (33% of defense outlays) in 2001 to 
$205 billion (35% of defense outlays) in 2008, yet the services complain of 
insufficient reinvestment. As the provision of resources has expanded, the demand 
has grown even faster. The GAO reported that in 2001 there were 75 major defense 
acquisition programs (MDAP) with total planned commitments of $790 billion. By 
2007, that portfolio grew to 95 programs valued at $1.6 trillion (GAO, 2008). Not only 
did the overall size of the portfolio grow in that time, the rate of cost growth for the 
average program also increased. Whether the provision of resources fueled 
claimants’ appetites or the provision of resources has been insufficient given 
demand is not important at this stage, it is important that those data seem to 
characterize a dynamic often associated with a CPR. To some, the defense program 
is underfunded, to others it is oversubscribed, but to everyone it is a problem of 
financial stocks and flows. CSIS recently reported one military department’s 
explanation of a troubled program as  
missteps of changing requirements and chronic underfunding in the past as 
the reasons for the pause in the program, but budget pressures make it clear 
that the organization can simply not afford to fund the entire program […] It is 
clear that block-building will delay the program further, and expose an already 
trimmed budget over a protracted period of time to increased budgetary 
pressure and competition from other [service] priorities. (Kaiser & 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 55 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
The interesting thing about the management of common pool resources is 
that ill effects do not always happen. Ostrom et al (1994)  found several cases in 
which the action arena resulted in quite cooperative and successful outcomes. And 
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